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Harald Conrad* & Jim McCafferty† 
 
 
UK Fund Managers and Institutional Investors’ Attitudes towards 
Japanese Equities 
 
Abstract: This article explores UK fund managers and institutional investors’ 
attitudes towards Japanese equities. We find a declining home bias of UK pension 
funds vis-à-vis Japanese equities since the early 1990s. However, for the most 
part, this decrease is a reflection of Japan’s decreasing equity market and GDP 
weights. Only in the 2000s did UK pension funds increase their Japanese equity 
holdings slightly. While our informants showed a comparatively high degree of 
variance in opinions about market factors, certain macro and institutional factors 
– namely economic growth, deflation, demographics, and corporate governance – 
were rated high as explanatory factors for an overall low enthusiasm in Japanese 
equities. Our discussion confirms that these factors appear to make investments in 
Japan comparatively less attractive. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the burst of the so-called bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s, Japan 
has been struggling with low and partially negative economic growth, ballooning 
public debt and lacklustre consumer spending. Nevertheless, the country is still the 
third largest economy in the world in GDP terms and has with Tokyo the world’s 
second largest stock market in terms of market capitalization (World Federation of 
Exchanges 2010). For these reasons, institutional investors and their fund managers 
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can hardly afford to ignore Japan as an investment destination. This paper explores 
the attitudes of UK institutional investors and their fund managers to Japanese 
equities and how they have changed since the burst of the bubble economy twenty 
years ago. In particular, we seek to answer whether the Japanese equity holdings of 
these investors have been reflective of asset allocation weightings as suggested by 
modern portfolio theory and which factors have been influencing their asset 
allocations into Japanese equities. Our findings relate primarily to UK corporate 
pension funds which have with US$ 13,196 billion the world’s third largest pension 
assets (Towers Watson 2010) and constitute the most important group of UK 
institutional investors, accounting for almost 30% of all equity capital which is 
professionally managed in the UK (Investment Management Association 2010). 
Our key findings are that UK pension funds show still a strong, albeit 
decreasing home bias investing predominately in UK equities. UK pension funds’ 
investments in Japanese equities have increased slightly over the 2000s, however, the 
declining home bias vis-à-vis Japanese equities is mainly a reflection of Japan’s 
decreasing equity market and GDP weights. While our informants showed a 
comparatively high degree of variance in opinions about market factors, certain macro 
and institutional factors – namely economic growth, deflation, demographics, and 
corporate governance – were rated high as explanatory factors for an overall declining 
enthusiasm in Japanese equities. 
To examine these issues in detail, this article proceeds as follows: After some 
methodological remarks, the article reviews the portfolio theory literature, focusing on 
issues of international portfolio diversification and home country bias. Applying these 
insights to UK investors’ positions in Japanese equities, we begin the findings section 
with an analysis of how foreign investors’ portfolio weightings in Japanese equities 
have changed over the last two decades. This is followed by a discussion of interview 
data that illuminate the various factors that have influenced their asset allocation 
decisions. Finally, the article closes with a short conclusion. 
 
Methodological Remarks 
 
This article is based on secondary literature and statistical data as well as primary data 
collected through interviews with UK fund managers with Japanese equities mandates. 
Our quantitative analysis is primarily based on data from Thomson Reuters 
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Datastream as well as published and unpublished data from BNY Mellon Asset 
Servicing. Furthermore, in order to understand the reasons behind the varying equity 
positions of UK institutional investors, we conducted a series of face to face 
interviews and conference calls with UK professional investors with holdings of 
Japanese equities.  
Informants were those who responded positively to an email request for 
interview sent to 40 UK-based Japanese equity fund managers in June 2009. These 
fund managers were identified through a customer relations management system used 
by investment banks called Big Dough. This information was verified and validated 
by an information provider called Lipper, which produces data on UK retail funds 
including fund managers with Japanese equity mandates. The email explained the 
nature of our project and invited fund managers to participate in a meeting. In total 
there were 12 positive responses and subsequently nine face to face meetings and 
three conference calls took place during July 2009. Appendix 1 presents anonymous 
information on the profiles of the institutions and informants, including their 
experience with Japanese equities and self-rated Japanese language abilities. Our 
analysis of Big Dough data suggests that the twelve informants represent assets under 
management of some £120bn, which equals about 16% of the UK’s total pension fund 
assets. 
Our interviews with the informants were semi-structured around a series of 
generic questions which sought to identify UK investor attitudes towards Japanese 
equities. This general discussion was followed by a simple quantitative assessment of 
UK investor attitudes to Japanese equities. The fund managers were presented with a 
questionnaire which asked them to identify reasons why UK pension funds have had 
underweight positions in Japanese equities. These included market factors, 
macroeconomic and institutional factors. Additionally, the informants were offered 
the opportunity to identify and discuss other factors which were beyond the scope of 
the questionnaire. The questionnaires were either completed at that point or completed 
separately and returned by email. Moreover, all informants were later asked to rate 
also the issues that other informants had raised and rated. Consequently, all 
informants responded to our initial list, but some failed to rate the additional issues. 
The results of the analysis of the numerical and interview data are presented in the 
findings and discussion sections. 
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Literature Review: International Diversification and the Home Bias  
 
Theoretical models of portfolio selection as developed by Harry Markowitz (1952) 
and James Tobin (1958) offer explanation and normative rules for the diversification 
of risky assets. The key argument is that if returns on assets are not correlated, 
diversification of assets can eliminate risk. Given the tendency of security returns to 
be higher correlated within countries than across countries, the benefits of 
international diversification of equity portfolios have been well-documented (e.g., 
Grubel 1968; Levy and Sarnat 1970). According to the international capital asset 
pricing model developed by Sharpe (1966), Lintner (1965a, b) and Mossin (1966), 
investors should hold the world portfolio of equities to limit their investment risk (Cai 
and Warnock 2004; Lewis 1999; Karolyi and Stulz 2001).  
However, academic theory and investor practice are wildly apart when it 
comes to international equity holdings within an investor’s equity portfolio. Portfolio 
investments are frequently highly concentrated in the domestic equity markets of 
investors, a phenomenon that is referred to as ‘home (country) bias.’ The home bias 
has been the subject of numerous studies that have tried to identify its particular 
nature and contributing factors, but there is no generally accepted explanation (e.g. 
Dahlquist et al. 2003).  
Bertaut and Kole (2004) show that country and regional fixed effects are 
important determinants of the degree of portfolio diversification. For example, Nordic 
countries appear overweight in equities from other Nordic countries and the same is 
true for equity holdings among euro-area countries. Moreover, the home bias is not 
limited to international portfolios, but persists across geographic areas within the 
same country. For example, many US investment managers exhibit a strong 
preference for locally headquartered firms (Coval and Moskowitz 1991). Investors 
tend to hold stocks they know, in effect thinking that the riskiness of stocks they do 
not know is very high. Furthermore, investors tend to be more optimistic about their 
own market than foreign investors (Shiller et al. 1990). Language barriers have also 
been shown to be influential factors (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2003, 2008). 
Overall, one can distinguish explicit and implicit barriers to international 
investment. Explicit factors are directly observable and include restrictions on foreign 
exchange transactions and withholding taxes. While such factors have played a large 
role before the 1970s, when most countries had restrictions on foreign exchange 
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transactions, AllianceBernstein (2006), French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994), and Kang and Stulz (1997) argue that such explicit barriers are no 
longer large enough to explain or justify the home bias.  
Instead, the focus has since shifted to implicit barriers that are not directly 
observable from brokerage statements. Such barriers include political, operational, 
economic, and investment risks and information asymmetries. Political risks comprise, 
but are not limited to, government instabilities, limited investor and property rights 
and other shortcomings in corporate governance. For example, US mutual funds are 
more likely to invest in equities of countries with stronger shareholder rights, legal 
systems and accounting disclosure (Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki 2005). 
Operational risks include illiquidity of markets, wide bid-ask spreads, ambiguous 
regulations and limited transparency (Wilshire Consulting 2008). 
The home bias is usually calculated by comparing an investor’s holdings of 
local equities with the investor’s country share of the global equity market. Figures 1a 
and 1b show how the home bias manifests itself in the equity allocation of local 
pension plans.  
For example, Australian pension funds invest 73% of their money in local 
equities, although the country’s weight in the MSCI World Index is only 2%. This 
means that the Australian pension funds are 71% overweight in local equities. Despite 
the fact that US pension funds invest 85% in local equities their home bias is with 
34% comparatively smaller, because US equities have a large share in the MSCI 
World Index. UK pension funds are 53% overweight in local stocks.  
 
Figures 1a and 1b about here 
 
Although the home country bias of UK pension funds continues to be 
substantial at around 50%, the situation has changed markedly since 1979, a year for 
which French and Porterba (1991) reported foreign assets holdings of UK pension 
funds of just 6%. Between 1991 and 1997, foreign equity holdings of UK pension 
funds rose to 27-30% of their total equity exposure (Timmermann and Blake 1999).  
Some investors use GDP country weights instead of market capitalisation 
country weights. This approach serves to sanity check the market capitalisation 
approach which can skew a country’s relative importance in situations where asset 
bubbles develop. Japan serves here as a major example. In the late 1980s, its stock 
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market was the biggest in the world representing between 40% to 55% of the global 
index. However, this reflected premium valuations rather than fundamentals. From a 
GDP perspective, Japan’s GDP remained second to the US in 1989 and represented a 
more modest 14% of the world (IMF 2010). The GDP approach gives each country a 
weight relative to its economic strength. However, implementation of this approach 
can be onerous and costly as it needs portfolios to be rebalanced on each occasion 
when new GDP figures are published or revised. 
 The potential benefits for an UK institutional investor from investing in 
Japanese equities become clear if we consider the correlation of equity markets. 
Calculations by Solnik and McLeavey (2004) show that only 9% of UK stock price 
movements are common to the Japanese market. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 2, 
among the major industrialized countries, the Japanese market has the lowest 
correlation with the UK market. For risk diversification purposes, Japanese equities 
should therefore be very attractive for UK investors. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Findings  
 
UK pension funds’ investments in Japanese equities 
 
The basis for the interviews with the informants was our observation that UK pension 
funds have been continuously underweight in Japanese equities if compared to market 
capitalization and GDP benchmarks. The results of our underlying calculations, which 
confirm in principle the home bias of UK pension funds as discussed in the literature 
review, are depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
While we need to be careful not to interpret too much into these numbers, they seem 
to allow three observations. First, the home bias with regards to Japanese equities has 
decreased since the 1990s. Second, during the 1990s this was not due to increased 
allocations into Japanese equities, but simply a reflection of Japan’s decreasing 
market capitalization and relative GDP. Thirdly, UK pension funds’ holdings of 
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Japanese equities increased slightly during the 2000s, but a home bias continues to 
exist. 
The purpose of our interviews was to learn more about the reasons why UK 
pension funds have been underweight in Japanese equities and how perceptions of 
Japanese equities have changed since the burst of the bubble economy 20 years ago. 
 
General attitudes towards Japanese equities 
 
Before we can examine the attitudes of UK institutional investors and fund managers 
towards Japanese equities in more detail, we need to explain shortly how pension 
funds make investment decisions. All pension funds adopt a “policy statement” which 
sets out the investment objectives with reference to constraints and benchmarks. 
Reilly and Brown (2003, p. 43) describe the “policy statement” as a “road map” in 
which investors specify their appetite for risk. Investment decisions are based on these 
policy statements to ensure that they are appropriate for the investors. Different 
pension funds will deploy different policy statements and also feature different asset 
allocation decisions. These, amongst other factors, are likely to be based on the 
maturity of the pension fund, its state of funding and whether the fund has defined 
benefit obligations. While a pension fund’s policy statement is likely to reflect a long 
term view – typically 25 years – investors needs do change over time, and for this 
reason, the policy statement is periodically reviewed and updated. Once a policy 
statement has been determined, pension funds are able to decide on realistic 
investment goals and set a standard by which to judge the performance of the 
portfolio manager. The latter is evaluated using “benchmarks” which typically refer to 
the performance of a given asset class during a set time period or the performance of 
the average fund in a peer group. The policy statement is augmented by the attribution 
of current financial/economic forecasts of future trends. This will form the judgement 
of the expected return from each asset class, and, by definition the overall portfolio. 
The combination of the fund’s policy statement and the financial market forecasts 
allows professional advisers to implement the investment strategy and determine how 
to allocate available funds across different countries, asset classes and securities. The 
process of asset allocation describes how an investor apportions funds into different 
asset classes.  
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Figure 4 highlights the average asset distribution of UK pension funds in 1999 
and 2009. The data shows a very material shift in asset allocation during these ten 
years. This highlights the fact that pension funds are maturing – and defined benefit 
schemes are being closed to new entrants. As a result, the average UK pension fund 
has reduced its exposure to equities from 72.9% in 1999 to just 48.1% in 2009. While 
this paper is principally concerned with the Japanese equity exposure within the 
overall equity allocation, it is important to note that the risk tolerance amongst our 
universe of investors has decreased with an overall shift to less risky asset classes.  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
We started our interviews with a discussion of the mechanics of the fund’s 
asset allocation process. All of our informants had specialised in Japanese equities for 
a minimum of fourteen years. Moreover, ten of the twelve informants were already 
specializing in Japanese equities during the period of the bubble economy of the late 
1980s. All of the informants had a role in formulating the amount of Japanese equity 
exposure a fund has. Despite the presence of lay personnel on the asset allocation 
committees of large pension funds, our informants made it clear that the asset 
allocation decision was made by professionals.  
Informant 4 has had a key role in the process of asset allocation with different 
funds. His perspective was that funds have different approaches when deciding asset 
allocation. He acknowledged that there was a tendency to move away from the “home 
country” bias, but noted that the starting point for determining country weightings 
would vary considerably between funds. Investors acknowledge country market 
capitalisations, but also accommodate for the relative sizes of the economies before 
committing to investing in countries. This informant stated that the portion of funds 
which were to be invested overseas was far from scientific or mechanical. The 
decision process was often influenced by the committee’s view of how important 
various economies would be in ten to twenty years time. In terms of Japan, this 
informant suggested that most asset allocation committees took the view that Japan 
will be less of a global economic player in years to come. He noted a material change 
in UK investor attitudes over the 1990s and 2000s which contrasts to the 1980s 
outlook when investors were excited about future prospects for Japan but had little 
exposure. Such beliefs were followed by a large build up of Japanese expertise within 
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the UK fund management industry. However, the burst of Japanese bubble at the 
beginning of the 1990s caused a number of UK based funds to question the merits of 
investing in Japan on valuation grounds. For example, PDFM (now UBS asset 
management) allocated a zero weighting to Japan at the beginning of the 1990s. Given 
the dramatic weakening of Japan’s stock market, which saw the Nikkei 225 index 
collapse from over 38,000 at the end of 1989 to 15,000 at the beginning of 1992 
(Thomson Reuters Datastream), there emerged a tendency for some pension schemes 
to avoid Japan on the grounds of its “irrational” (Informant 2) stock market. This 
legacy continued as Japan’s equity market returns sustained a lacklustre fashion 
throughout the 1990s. Informant 4 suggested that UK pension funds in the 1990s did 
not pay much attention to Japan on the grounds that the country “is a long way away” 
and “there was no real reason to worry about it”.  
All of our informants noted that the Japanese market had more volatility and 
less correlation with Western markets, which would in theory make Japanese equities 
attractive from a pension fund diversification point of view. However, informant 4 
suggested that these factors were countered by a less enthusiastic attitude towards 
Japan which can be summed up in the following statement: “People know Japan less 
now than they did ten to twenty years ago”. This view was echoed by informant 5 
who noted that in his twenty year tenure as a Japan specialist, foreigners have tended 
to have an opinion on Japan, but within the last six to twelve months, “people just 
don’t care at all”. Informant 5 stated that UK investor apathy in Japan were directly 
related to the post bubble performance of the Japanese equity market, which saw the 
Nikkei index underperform the rest of the world by 85% in eight years. He pointed to 
the post bubble Japanese equity market experience as one of two unequal halves. 
Broadly speaking, during the first half from 1989 to 1997, Japan halved while the rest 
of the world doubled: “Memories of 1989 to 1997 are so painful they still exist. 
Anyone who had experience of running international money in that period was 
thinking Japan is a disaster”. However, during the latter half, which Informant 5 
describes as the twelve year period from December 1997 to December 2008, Japan’s 
market performed broadly in line with the rest of the world. Yet, according to this 
informant, despite this more respectable performance, including strong years in 1999, 
2003 and 2005, investor perceptions have been clouded by the post bubble experience.  
Informant 6 described the level of interest in Japanese equities at the asset 
allocation committees as varying from zero interest in some periods to high interest in 
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other periods. For the years 2002-3, he described the attitude of the asset allocation 
committees to him as the Japanese equity fund manager as one of “Why are you 
here?” This changed to “frenzied interest” in October 2005, when hopes of a Koizumi 
government (2001-2006) propelled recovery caused small-capitalization stocks to 
surge.  
Informant 6 is employed by an asset management firm which requires all fund 
managers to input a score about their country prospects to pension funds’ asset 
allocation committees on a frequent basis. Therefore, asset allocation is partly 
determined by considering changes in the manager’s opinion of that country. In 
addition, other factors such as economic growth, earnings forecasts and political risk 
are considered. Informant 7 described a similar approach to asset allocation being 
practised at his firm. 
Informant 8 highlighted that professional investors are aware of the risks 
involved of being underweight in Japan. He noted that when Asia (ex-Japan) markets 
have performed well, the Japanese market starts to look relatively attractive. He stated 
that UK investors tend to “flood into Japan” in the later stages of bull markets. To this 
informant this reflected Japan’s sheer weight in terms of market capitalization, rather 
than its merits as an investment location.  
Informant 9 attributed a lack of UK investor appetite for Japanese equities to 
its weak record of returns. He also noted that Japan, like the US, is seen by UK 
investors as an expensive market on traditional valuation metrics such as price-
earnings-ratio. He suggested that Japan often suffers because of its geographic 
proximity to the rest of Asia which has in recent years offered superior growth 
prospects. Informant 9 cited situations when UK investors had higher allocations to 
Thailand than Japan, despite the former’s weaker position in terms of GDP and 
market capitalization benchmarks. 
Informants 2 and 3 gave personal anecdotes which seem to capture many of 
the negative attitudes UK professional investors have developed towards Japan. 
Informant 3 cited a Japanese equity fund manager at a pension fund encouraging the 
asset allocation committee to place less capital in Japan. To this informant, this was 
not an expected behaviour as it undermined the role and requirement of a Japanese 
equity specialist. Informant 2 stated explicitly that he had no personal holdings in 
Japan, despite owning equities in other markets. He believed that other UK-based 
Japanese equities specialists think in the same way. 
 12 
Informant 2 added an interesting twist to the legacy of the performance issue. 
Fund managers are naturally often keen to buy shares which have underperformed: 
“The Japanese equity market has been such a laggard that we have been reluctant to 
have an underweight position in Japan”. Informant 2 added that Japan’s reduced 
weighting as part of the world index is due to its dramatic underperformance in the 
1989-1997 period, which reduced the pressure on asset allocation committees to 
invest in Japan: “In 1990, when Japan represented about 40% of the world index, UK 
pension funds felt compelled to invest in Japan. Today, however, Japan represents a 
mere 10% of the world index, making it increasingly peripheral in an equity asset 
allocation decision.” Informant 4 summed up the UK investor sentiment towards 
Japan succinctly: “It is, at the moment, the forgotten market”. 
 
Common concerns 
 
In order to get a better sense of the variance of opinions among our informants, we 
asked them to rate factors that in their view have contributed to an underweight 
position of UK pension funds in Japanese equities. The informants rated these factors 
on a 10-point Likert scale, with 1 meaning that they considered a factor to be 
unimportant and 10 that a factor was considered to be an important explanatory 
variable. The results of this survey are shown in figure 5. While the informants 
showed a comparatively high degree of variance in opinions about market factors, 
certain macro and institutional factors – namely economic growth, deflation, 
demographics, and corporate governance – were rated high by most of them. 
All informants expressed negative views about Japan’s recent economic 
growth and growth potentials, especially when compared to its Asian neighbours. In 
response to this negative macroeconomic assessment, half of the informants chose to 
divide Japanese equities explicitly into two categories: exporters and domestic 
companies. This reflects their opinion that exporters are exposed to competition and 
have had to strengthen themselves in order to cope within an internationally 
competitive market.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
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Informant 1 described the exporters as being like an army exposed to battle 
while “most domestic companies are pretty mollycoddled by government regulation. 
More bankruptcies in Japan would be desirable”. This informant estimated that more 
than half of the Japanese market was made up of exporters, reflecting the fact that 
many domestic companies are not listed. Those that are listed often tended to be small 
in market value terms, and perhaps not sufficiently liquid to attract non-Japanese 
investors. Domestic companies in Japan have also been more vulnerable to deflation 
than the exporters. According to this informant, electronics and automobile producers 
had presided over price decreases, but these had been more a function of 
technological change than a result of Japan’s deflationary monetary environment. An 
underweight position in Japanese equities by UK investors could be easily reconciled 
by the fact that investors would restrict themselves to only one half of the market. 
Informant 2 endorsed this preference of investing in global Japanese 
companies such as Toyota and Honda “due to the pretty negative outlook for the 
Japanese economy”. However, the recent strength of the Japanese Yen, which has 
weakened the position of the exporters, had forced this informant to scan domestic 
Japanese companies as part of the stock selection process.  
Informant 9 also considered Japan from the exporter/domestic viewpoint, but 
suggested that deflation was not such a serious issue, although it added to the overall 
gloom in economic outlook. Informant 2, on the other hand, stated that most domestic 
stocks had “really struggled because of deflation”, which negatively effected 
domestic demand due to consumer expectations about lower prices in the future. 
According to this informant, weak demand was further augmented by Japan’s fast 
ageing population, with older consumers spending even less than younger ones. These 
points were also highlighted by informants 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12. Informant 5 stated that 
Japan’s “awful demographics” were a material factor in deterring investors from 
investing in its domestic stocks.  
Informant 3 noted that investors were deterred from Japan not only because of 
its growth rates but highlighted that Japanese government’s borrowing had stifled the 
domestic economy. This had resulted in a “crowding out effect”, reducing incentives 
to invest, work and innovate. He mused that there had been no real effort by the 
Japanese government to correct this situation. Meanwhile, he concurred with 
informant 2 that the aging population and a conservative approach to spending had 
created a poor environment for domestic growth. Against this background, informant 
 14 
3 invests in Japanese exporters and notes that “most asset allocators see domestic 
Japan as being dampened by debt, the age profile, and low growth.”  
Informant 7 concurred with informant 3 that Japan’s large government debt 
had deterred UK investors from investing in Japan, but stressed that informed 
investors should understand that Japan remained to be a creditor country and that 
most debt was held internally.  
Informant 6 concurred with other informants on deflation and demographics to 
be “very important” factors when making a judgement on Japan. However, he also 
believed that deflation, while certainly negative from a macro perspective, was in its 
“steady state” less of a threat given that the markets disliked uncertainty even more. 
Informant 7 was more cautious on deflation and pointed instead to a general 
lack of pricing power in Japan. He pointed out that the recent price increase in beer by 
Asahi Breweries was the first since the 1980s. He also noted that deflation has a 
negative impact on equities, as it increases the real value of a company’s debt. 
Furthermore, he believed that it was logical for UK investors to compartmentalize 
Japan’s stock market into exporters and domestic companies. This reflected the fact 
that the Japanese economy was actually much less dependent on exports than the 
stock market itself. However, the informant suggested that choosing to invest in 
Japanese exporters alone would preclude investors from participating in some of the 
growth sectors within Japan’s domestic economy. 
Besides the macroeconomic factors discussed above, most informants agreed 
that corporate governance issues were limiting the overall attractiveness of Japanese 
equities. Informant 1 stated: “The biggest difficulty is that Japanese companies often 
like to appoint auditors who were previously officers of the company. UK investors 
are likely to vote against internal auditors being appointed.” He also noted that the 
poison pill takeover defences which have been put in place by Japanese companies in 
the past few years have tended to backfire. According to this informant it was a well-
known fact that these companies subsequently underperformed. Consequently, UK 
investors would be very cautious about buying a poison pill company and investor 
tools such as Bloomberg made it very visible if a company had this characteristic.  
Informant 2 believed that weak corporate governance was not such an 
important issue for UK investors who select the large Western-style exporters as 
portfolio holdings. He noted that these companies are “signed up to Western 
corporate governance practice already”. Furthermore, annual reports and accounts 
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from such companies addressed explicitly governance issues. He also noted that a lot 
of companies, such as Takeda and Toyota, have been engaging in investor friendly 
practices such as share buybacks over the last ten years.  
Informant 3 noted that Japanese companies lack a shareholder focus and show 
minimal sympathy towards Western investors. He suggested that the lack of 
responsiveness to shareholders at the corporate level reflected the fact that companies 
tried to optimize outcomes for other stakeholders such as employees, customers and 
suppliers. Informant 4 echoed this view, but suggested changing practices. He noted 
that prior to the late 1990s the stable shareholder ratio for Japanese companies was 
more than 60%. According to this informant, companies showed more respect for 
these stable cross-shareholders than portfolio shareholders during this time. Japanese 
companies would always know exactly how much of their equity capital was in the 
hands of these “friendly” shareholders and were “terrified about the loss of corporate 
control”. However, as for recent developments, the informant noted that “dividend 
payments have rocketed”.  
Informant 6 concurred with informant 3 that corporate governance practices 
were changing. Today, investor presentations would always feature a page on 
shareholder rewards, while this was not a priority ten years ago.  
Informant 8 explained that he had never believed that Japanese companies did 
not care about their shareholders but fund managers covering other geographies 
within the same organization were adamant that Japanese companies held little regard 
for them. He suggested that Japanese companies do work in the interests of 
shareholders, but have had to be mindful that different stakeholders have different 
objectives. For example, stable shareholders such as supplier companies might not be 
entirely motivated by maximizing shareholder value. Moreover, improvements in 
corporate governance practice developed as the keiretsu cross shareholding structures 
unwound at the end of the 1990s. This was driven by the requirement for shareholders, 
such as banks, to liquidate positions in order to bolster their capital ratios. This trend 
was described by Informant 8 as causing a “dislocation of the shareholder register”, 
as non-institutional holders sold their positions. Subsequently, in the 2001 to 2002 
period, there was “a massive recovery in corporate profits in Japan”, which appeared 
to the informant to have been at least partially driven by a change in the composition 
of the shareholder register.  
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Discussion 
 
As highlighted above, our informants showed a comparatively high degree of variance 
in opinions about market factors, while some macro and institutional factors – namely 
economic growth, demographics, deflation, and corporate governance – were rated 
high as explanatory factors for UK institutional investors’ lack of investment in 
Japanese equities. In this section we investigate to which extent these opinions 
correspond with objectively measurable data and assessments in the academic 
literature. Furthermore, we present additional data which help to put the opinions of 
our respondents into perspective.  
 
Economic growth, demographics, and deflation 
 
All of our informants expressed concern about Japan’s lacklustre economic growth, 
especially if compared to its Asian neighbours. Figure 6, which shows the GDP 
growth rates of major industrialized and newly industrializing countries including 
China and India, confirms this negative assessment. In terms of past and predicted 
GDP growth rates, Japan trails behind these countries. These low growth rates have 
influenced domestic demand which in turn has negatively affected corporate earnings. 
During the ten year period from 1998 to 2008, Japanese company earnings growth has 
averaged 3% per annum. This compares to 7% in the UK, and 5% in the US. 
Moreover, Japanese equities have underperformed the world index by some 83% over 
the past ten years (authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters Datastream). This 
performance legacy appeared to attract the most emotional opinions in our interviews. 
Informant 10 explicitly suggested that “poor returns over prolonged periods in the 
past mean low perceived risk in avoiding Japan”.  
Closely related to Japan’s recent lacklustre economic growth record are the 
issues of demographic aging and deflation, rated highly by our informants. Japan has 
the fastest aging population in the world. As can be seen in figure 7, in the year 2010 
the percentage of the population aged 65 and older was the highest among the selected 
countries. This demographic aging trend will continue for at least another 40 years 
and have a substantial negative effect on Japan’s future growth potential. 
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Figure 6 about here 
 
 
 Theoretically, one can distinguish six factors that influence the growth of 
GNP per capita, namely growth in labour efficiency, changes in dependency ratios 
between economically active and non-active parts of the population, changes in the 
capital intensity of production, changes in the investment income from abroad, 
changes in labour force participation rates, and changes in terms of trade (Turner et al. 
1998). While precise predications about the development of these factors are difficult 
due to numerous underlying assumptions, all researchers agree that the shrinking of 
Japan’s working age population will result in a substantial increase of its dependency 
ratio, which can negatively impact living standards per capita. There is, however, 
disagreement to what extent the impact of this factor can be mitigated by 
improvements in other factors. While Matsutani (2006) predicts an absolute shrinkage 
of Japan’s real national income, other researchers conclude that living standards per 
capita will continue to rise, albeit at much lower levels than so far and at 
comparatively lower levels than in other major industrialised countries (Turner et al. 
1998; Fougère and Mérette 1999; Kawase and Ogura 2008). 
 In reaction to the burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, Japanese 
firms engaged in corporate restructuring and wage level growth trailed behind 
increases in labour productivity (Matsutani 2006). While such strategies were rational 
from an individual companies’ point of view to boost profitability, they have at the 
national level contributed to a deflationary spiral of weakened consumer demand and 
lower GDP growth.  
 Against the backdrop of ongoing deflationary pressures and limited future 
economic growth potential, foreign investors’ diminishing appetite for Japanese 
equities seems logical. After all, it appears likely that Japanese firms will continue to 
experience decreasing local demand and earnings growth in the future. Therefore, 
foreign investors’ strategy to invest primarily in export-oriented companies, as 
suggested by a number of our informants, seems highly rational. Exports are the only 
element of demand that does not depend on wages in the local economy. Moreover, in 
the 2000s, Japan’s exporters have benefited from weak wage growth of regular labour, 
a rising supply of cheap non-regular labour, and a rising demand from developing 
countries.   
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Figure 7 about here 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
Let us finally address corporate governance as an important institutional factor 
highlighted by our informants. Japanese corporate governance has been described by 
various labels, such as bank-based, relationship-oriented, network, insider, 
stakeholder, or coordinated model of corporate governance (Jackson and Miyajima 
2007). These labels indicate that Japanese practices deviate from shareholder-
orientation and liberal market principles dominant in Anglo-American economies. 
Until the early 1990s, a stylized picture of Japanese corporate governance would 
include the following main features: First, ownership patterns characterized by ‘stable 
shareholders’ with reciprocally held cross-shareholdings among corporations and 
banks. These shareholders tended to be stakeholders with long-term interests in the 
firm in addition to return on their equity investments; second, main banks playing a 
central role in monitoring management; third, long-term employment and seniority-
oriented pay practices of regular male employees; forth, large boards of directors, 
consisting largely of internally promoted managers and few externally recruited top 
managers and independent outside board members (Jackson and Miyajima 2007).  
Over the 1990s, these patterns underwent substantial changes. Ownership by 
foreign and institutional investors increased with the erosion of stable and cross-
shareholding arrangements, while bank lending in large firms and the importance of 
main banks decreased. After 1997, board reforms saw an increasing number of 
outside directors, the introduction of a new optional “American style” board with 
committees system and stock options. Human resource management reforms included 
the introduction of performance-based pay practices (Jackson and Miyajima 2007; 
Ahmadjian 2007; Conrad 2010).  
 One major driving force behind these changes has been Japan’s increased 
internationalization. Since the late 1990s, inward foreign direct investment became a 
key policy priority in Japan and corporate governance reform was intended to 
facilitate cross-border M&A. In 2004, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) adopted 
corporate governance principles spelled out by the OECD in 1998, although the TSE 
principles do not constitute mandatory listing requirements or British ‘comply or 
explain’ rules (TSE 2004). The importance of foreign investors has increased 
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significantly. In terms of market value, foreign investors owned 23.6% of stocks listed 
on the Tokyo Stock exchange in 2009, compared to just 6% in 1992 (TSE various 
years).  
 Which relationship exists between foreign ownership and corporate 
governance practices in Japan? Half of our informants noted that they concentrate 
their investments on large export-oriented firms. Calculations by Ahmadjian (2007) 
and Hiraki et al. (2003) confirm this pattern for companies on the first section on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. Kang and Stulz (1997) report similar findings. Foreign 
ownership is positively correlated with increasing firm size and export/sales ratios. As 
noted above, this investment pattern appears to make sense in the light of Japan’s 
macroeconomic situation. Moreover, these export-oriented companies tend to adhere 
stronger to Anglo-American governance standards, as they are measured by the 
JCGIndex by the Japan Corporate Governance Index Research Institute. This index 
evaluates how a firm sets its performance objectives, the accountability of the CEO, 
the structure of the board of directors in terms of size, independence and 
responsibilities, compensation system, management of subsidiaries, internal audit and 
control, and disclosure and transparency. The index shows that firms with a high 
score in each of these components tend to have larger percentages of foreign 
ownership (Ahmadjian 2007) and, by and large, higher export/sales ratios.  
 By investing predominately in large export-oriented firms, UK pension funds 
do thus not only circumvent problems in Japanese domestic economy, they ensure at 
the same time that these companies subscribe more or less to Western concepts of 
corporate governance and understand the fiduciary duties of UK pension funds as they 
are laid down in the UK pension Act of 1995. 
 
A comparative perspective 
 
Despite the fact that our informants expressed largely rather negative opinions on 
Japanese equities and a home bias unquestionably continues to exist, we concluded 
that a more meaningful analysis should also look at UK pension funds’ investments in 
other foreign equities. Figures 8 and 9 present the results of our calculations. The 
method of calculating these figures is essentially the same as in figure 3. However, 
while figure 3 shows the percentages for equity holdings, market and GDP 
benchmarks for Japanese equities only, these figures include the numbers for US, 
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Europe ex UK, and UK equities. Emerging market investments of UK pension funds 
are still negligible and were thus omitted. Moreover, to make it easier to compare the 
investments in the different equities with their respective benchmarks, the figures 
show the percentage point differences between the benchmarks and the actual 
investment in these equities. For example, in the year 2009, the market capitalisation 
of the Japanese equity market relative to the world equity market was 8.8 %, while 
6.6% of UK pension funds’ equity investments were in Japanese equities (Figure 8). 
The difference of 2.2 percentage points shows the ‘underinvestment’ in Japanese 
equities. In contrast, UK pension funds’ investments show a strong home bias with 
investments in UK equities being 41.7 percentage points higher than the world market 
capitalization of the UK equity market. 
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
Figure 9 shows the same comparisons with reference to the GDP benchmarks.  
 What can we learn from these numbers?  First, it is obvious that the home bias 
of UK pension funds has decreased substantially during the 2000s on a market 
capitalization and GDP basis. Second, and perhaps most surprisingly, despite the 
overall rather negative assessments of our informants about the attractiveness of the 
Japanese market, we can see that UK pension funds have in strictly numerical terms 
been less biased against Japanese equities than against US and Europe ex UK equities. 
However, this is, as pointed out already, less the result of a strongly increased interest 
in Japan, but rather due to Japan’s decreasing market and GDP weights. While the 
share of UK pension funds’ investments in Japanese equities has been comparatively 
stable between 1990 and 2009 (fluctuating between 3.5% and 7.6%), the share of 
investments in US equities increased markedly in the 2000s (from 7.3% in 2001 to 
18.7% in 2009), although the market capitalization of the US market relative to the 
world market decreased from 49.7% to 33.1% during the same time period. In other 
words, the decreasing home bias vis-à-vis US equities is clearly the result of an 
increased interest in the US equity market. 
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
 
Conclusion 
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This article concludes that UK pension funds are continuing to expand their 
investment horizons overseas as part of modern asset allocation strategies. However, 
there remains still a strong, albeit decreasing home bias. In terms of investments in 
Japanese equities, we can witness a decreasing home bias since the early 1990s. 
However, for the most part, this decrease is a reflection of Japan’s decreasing market 
and GDP weights. Only in the 2000s did UK pension funds increase their Japanese 
equity holdings slightly. 
While our informants showed a comparatively high degree of variance in 
opinions about market factors, certain macro and institutional factors – namely 
economic growth, deflation, demographics, and corporate governance – were rated 
high as explanatory factors for an overall low enthusiasm in Japanese equities. Our 
discussion has confirmed that these factors make investments in Japan comparatively 
less attractive than in other markets. A strategy of investing primarily in large 
Japanese export-oriented companies, as pursued by about half of our informants, 
allows these investors to limit risks related to Japan’s lacklustre domestic economy 
and limits their exposure to Japan to such companies that adhere stronger to Anglo-
American governance standards, as they are measured by the JCGIndex. 
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Figure 1a: Equity Allocation of Local Pension Plans  
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Figure 1b: Equity Allocation of Local Pension Plans vs. Home-Country Weight 
of MSCI World Index 
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Notes: 1) Percentages for the US and Canada are for the year 2002; for the UK and Japan for the year 
2001. 2) Data for Canada cover only the top 100 pension plans, excluding the Canadian Pension Plan 
and the Quebec Pension Plan. 
 
Source: AllianceBernstein 2006 
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Figure 2: Correlation of Markets: January 1992 to January 2002 (Monthly 
Returns) 
Market (UK) Correlation 
Coefficient 
R² 
UK 1 1 
Canada 0.58 0.3364 
USA 0.63 0.3969 
France  0.74 0.5476 
Germany 0.62 0.3844 
Italy 0.49 0.2401 
Switzerland 0.69 0.4761 
Japan 0.3 0.09 
Hong Kong 0.53 0.2809 
Source: Solnik and McLeavey 2004: 460 
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Figure 3: UK Pension Funds’ Exposure to Japan versus Benchmark 
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Figure 4: UK Pension Fund Asset Distribution 
Asset class Weighting (%) 
2009 
Weighting (%) 
1999 
Equities 48.1 72.9 
Bonds 30.9 15.4 
Other fixed income 13.0 4.0 
Cash 3.7 5.8 
Property 3.1 1.7 
Other 1.2 0.2 
TOTAL 100 100 
Source: BNY Mellon Asset Servicing (2009) 
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Figure 5: Investor Questionnaire: Why do you think UK pension funds are 
underweight Japan? Please rate the following factors from 1 to 10  
(1 = unimportant explanatory factor; 10 = very important explanatory factor) 
INFORMENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Market Factors 
-Dividend income 8 5 1 2 3 5 4 3 2 7 3 7 
-P/E Ratio 9 2 2.5 4 10 7 5 3 6 5 5 7 
-P/B Ratio 8 2 7 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 5 
-Free-float 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 3 5 
-Liquidity 7 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 
 
Macro Factors 
-Economic growth 8 6 8 8 10 10 9 8 8 8 10 9 
-Deflation 2 7 7 8 8 5 6 8 5 5 10 5 
-External debt 2 2 6 1 2 1 2 6 1 6 1 3 
-Export dependence 5 5 8 1 9 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 
-Demographics 10 6 8 9 10 10 10 7 8 7 10 8 
 
Institutional Factors 
-Corporate governance 9 5 6 7 10 8 9 6 7 5 5 9 
-Cross-shareholdings 6 5 7 3 8 5 4 6 3 2 3 8 
-Investor relations 9 5 5 6 7 10 6 5 2 5 3 5 
-Transparency 4 6 5 2 8 10 8 6 3 5 3 7 
-Corruption 2 2 4 1 4 1 2 5 1 3 2 2 
-Availability of information in English 10 2 5 1 7 3 3 4 2 1 5 5 
 
Other Factors 
-Economic growth in Asia ex Japan  9 7 9 7   9 9 8 10 9 
-Corporate debt/equity ratios   2 7 1 7   3 4 5 3 5 
-Non-performing loan crisis   7 8 7   4 6 7 3 3 
-ROE (Return on Equity)    7 8 7   5 8 5 6 8 
-Racism    9 8   2 1 1 5 1 
-Political stability    1    8 4 1 3 7 
Source: Survey conducted by the authors in July 2009 
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Figure 6: Gross Domestic Product (Constant Prices), Percent Changes (Year on 
Year), 1990-2014 
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Note: From 2010 onwards IMF staff estimates 
Source: IMF 2010 
 
Figure 7: Population aged 65 or over (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: medium variant of projection 
Source: United Nations 2010 
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Figure 8: Home Bias of UK Pension Funds (Differences between UK Pension 
Fund Allocations in Global Equities and Their Respective World Market 
Weightings) 
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Notes and Sources: same as in figure 3. 
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Figure 9: Home Bias of UK Pension Funds (Differences between UK Pension 
Fund Allocations in Global Equities and the GDP Benchmarks) 
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Notes and Sources: same as in figure 3. 
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Appendix 1: List of Informants 
Informant Type of Organization Function of 
informant 
Japanese 
equity 
experience of 
informant (in 
years) 
Japanese 
language ability 
of informant (self-
stated)  
(Yes/No) 
1 Provider of international asset management services for 
pension funds, charities, endowments, foundations and 
high net worth individuals. Has over US$ 3bn of assets 
under management. 
Portfolio 
Manager 
25 Yes 
2 Principal investment manager to a former state owned 
enterprise. Manages an occupational pension scheme, is 
sponsored by a FTSE 100 company, and has close to 
US$ 20bn of funds under management in all asset classes. 
Portfolio 
Manager 
20 
 
No 
3 Specialist investment management business. Manages 
US$ 16.4bn in active equity portfolios for clients across 
Europe, North America and elsewhere around the world. 
Fund manager 
 
20 No 
4 Global investment adviser to corporations, foundations, 
trustees, and endowments. Assists with every aspect of 
institutional investing, from strategy, structure and 
implementation, through to ongoing portfolio 
management. Manages assets in excess of US$ 3.5tr. 
Principal 26 No 
5 International investment management business Has a 
growing international client base from the Americas, 
Europe, Asia the Middle East, Australia and Africa. 
Manages assets in excess of US$ 50bn. 
Fund Manager 23 Yes 
6 Large private bank, with assets under management and 
custody totalling US$ 285bn. Company focuses solely on 
managing the wealth of private and institutional investors. 
Senior 
Investment 
Manager 
17 Yes 
7 Asset management firm with over US$ 5bn of assets in 
long only and hedge fund products, primarily for 
institutional clients. 
Fund manager 20 No 
8 Asset management firm with over US$ 40bn of assets 
belonging to a major FTSE 100 company. Operates under 
a multi-specialist structure and is made up of a series of 
investment capabilities, ranging across a variety of asset 
classes. 
Fund manager 22 No 
9 Uses active asset allocation in managed portfolios to meet 
clients' diverse needs. Its funds and strategies cover a 
broad range of asset classes and currencies to cater for all 
market conditions. It has some US$ 40bn of assets under 
management. 
Fund manager 14 No 
10 UK based local authority pension fund with assets under 
management of around US$ 12bn. 
Fund manager 26 No 
11 Global asset management firm with a major presence in 
London. Manages more than US$ 18bn of assets. 
Fund manager 25 No 
12 Assurance society providing financial services to its 
members and customers. Has over US$ 7bn of assets 
under management. 
Investment 
director 
20 No 
 
 
 
 
 
